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n the Relevancy of Imagery to the Processes 
of Thought 



BY 
CLAIRE COMSTOCK 



Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University in partial fulfilment of the require- 
ments for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 



Reprinted from The American Journal of Psychology 
April, 1921, Vol. XXXII, pp. 196-230 



On the Relevancy of Imagery to the Processes 

of Thought 



BY 
CLAIRE COMSTOCK 



Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University in partial fulfilment of the require- 
ments for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 



Reprinted from The American Journal of Psychology 
April, 1921, Vol. XXXII, pp. 196-230 






i 



0,^- 






ON THE RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO THE 
PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 1 



By Claire Com stock 

Page 

I. Introduction 196 

II. Experiment A 197 

1. Problems 197 

2. Repetition of Fox's Experiment 206 

III. Experiment B 211 

1. Likenesses and Differences 211 

2. Experiment Under Non-Laboratory Conditions 216 

IV. Experiment C 216 

1. Sorting Problems 217 

2. Reading Problem Containing Irrelevant Meanings 218 

3. Reading Problem Containing Typographical Errors 219 

V. Experiment D 219 

1. Pictures 219 

2. Completion-Tests 222 

3. Three-word Imagery 223 

VI. Conclusion 229 

In an article in the Zeitschrift fur Psychologic 2 Dr. Korlka 
of Giessen says in criticism of an analysis of " Conscious 
Attitudes " : 3 " It is obvious that analysis meant for the author 
and her observers nothing else than the exhibition of the 
sensory contents present at any given moment. 
These sensory contents may [however] be irrelevant to the 
thought, or may be the necessary condition of the arousal of 
the thought, or may finally be the thought itself." Clearly 
the value of the analysis of a thought-process is dependent 
upon the relevancy of the contents which constitute that 
analysis to the thought-process analyzed. To find a criterion 
of relevancy and irrelevancy we undertook the following 
series of experiments. More particularly, we hoped to secure 
a basis for answering such a question as that asked by KofTka : 
How do we know that any sensory content is relevant or 
irrelevant to a thought? We have concerned ourselves espe- 
cially with the relation of imaginal contents to thought, since 
it seemed wise to limit the problem. The O's have, however, 

1 From the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University. 

2 63, 1912, 219. 

3 H. M. Clarke, Conscious Attitudes, Am. Jour. Psych., 22, 1911, 
214-219. 

196 



197 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

frequently mentioned in their reports the parts played by 
sensory kinaesthesis and by feeling. 

Relevancy may be of two kinds, material and logical. It 
is possible for imaginal contents to be materially relevant 
but logically irrelevant to a thought. For example, in reply 
to a question concerning the number of small boxes con- 
tained within larger ones, an gave the correct answer, 21. 
When asked to report the imagery upon which this answer 
was based, he described a complex visual image of white 
boxes about six inches square with a grey interior. Logically, 
the grey and the white and the dimensions have nothing to 
do with the solution of the problem. The boxes might just 
as well have been red, or have had no color ascribed to them. 
Materially, however, the imagery was relevant, since for this 
particular the meaning ' box ' was carried by the particular 
kind of box described. 4 

We started out with the belief that we might find in the 
analysis of thought-processes a good deal of irrelevant ma- 
terial. We expected to have reported contents irrelevant to 
the thought concerned. Our task was then to be a determina- 
tion of the psychological criteria of this irrelevancy. The 
results of our experiments have, however, forced us to the 
opposite point of view. They show that, if imagery is present 
as part of the contents of thought, it is ipso facto relevant to 
the thought. This conclusion we reached only at the end of 
a series of experiments, in every one of which we had been 
1 set ' to find irrelevant imagery in Koffka's sense. 

We attacked the problem first on the side of relevancy, 
though always with the expectation of getting indirectly at 
irrelevancy. Our task was in part one of method, and the 
attempt to secure certain experimental conditions explains the 
sequence of the separate experiments which we undertook. 

Experiment A. 1. Problems 

Our aim here was to study the imaginal contents of thought 
with reference to its uses and relevancy to the thought. The 
method consisted of presenting to the a simple problem 
to which he was asked to give an answer. After the answer 
had been given, he was asked to report the experiences upon 
which it was based. There were 83 problems or questions 
which may be roughly classified as follows : 

1. Arithmetic problems (9). 5 

4 Cf. H. L. Hollingworth, The Vicarious Functioning of Irrelevant 
Imagery, Jour. Philos. Psych. Sci. Meth., 8, 1911, 690. 

5 The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of problems of 
the various kinds. 



COMSTOCK 198 

Ex. At ten cents a yard, how much will eighteen feet of cloth cost? 

2. Ingenuity problems (12). 

(a) Easy (9). 

Ex. A man wanted to catch a kitten, but the kitten ran up a tall 
tree which no person could climb. How could he get the kitten 
without hurting it? 

(b) Difficult (3). 

Ex. Out of 6 toothpicks make 4 equilateral triangles each one of 
whose sides shall be as long as a toothpick. 

3. Abstract problems (3). 

Ex. If the possession of money or wealth in any form should 
come to be regarded as dishonorable, what significant changes would 
result ? 

4. General Information problems (24). 
Ex. Where is the painting, Mona Lisa? 

5. Completion problems (4). 

Ex. Supply the missing letters : F-r o-f-c-a- b-s-n-s- o-l-. 

6. Enumeration problems (8). 

Ex. If a box has 4 smaller boxes inside of it, and each one of the 
smaller boxes contains 4 little tiny boxes, how many boxes are there 
altogether, counting the big one? 

7. Action problems (6). 

Ex. Suppose that you stooped down to lift up a large bucket full 
of water, but that as you stooped down to lift it up it proved to be 
empty. What would happen? 

8. Simple Judgment problems (5). 

Ex. What is the thing to do if you go to sleep on the train, and 
do not wake up until you are several miles past the station where 
you wanted to get off? 

9. Comparison problems (6). 

Ex. If grey is darker than white, and black is darker than grey, 
what shade of those named in this sentence is lighter than grey? 

10. Direction problems (3). 

Ex. Suppose that you are going north, then you turn to your left, 
and then to your right. In what direction are you going now? 

11. Imaginal problems (3). 

Ex. Suppose that it is fourteen minutes before three o'clock. Now 
suppose that the two hands of the clock were to change places, so 
that the large hand takes the place of the small hand and the small 
hand takes the place of the large hand. What time would it then be? 

We tried to include problems of various types, ranging 
from very simple questions, to which the answers were given 
immediately and automatically, to more difficult problems 
where complex processes of thought were involved. We hoped 
also to give opportunity for the use of different kinds of 
imagery, as visual (group 11), kinaesthetic (group 7), verbal- 
motor (group 1), etc; though we realized, of course, that the 
type of imagery used depends principally upon the imaginal 
type of the O. 

At first the problems were typewritten and given to the O's to read. 
With this procedure it was, however, impossible to control conditions, 
since the O's tended to glance back over the problem, even though 
only one reading was formally allowed. This source of error pre- 
vented the taking of a time-record, which is sufficiently rough at best, 



199 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

since here the reading of the problem and its solution were inextricably 
combined. We then changed our procedure ; E read the problem to 
O who was seated with his eyes closed and his back to E. When 
the last word of the problem had been read, E started the stop-watch, 
and stopped it when gave his answer. 

The instructions were : " I shall set you a simple problem. Your 
immediate task is to solve the problem. After you have reported 
your answer, I shall ask you to describe as well as you can the ex- 
periences upon which your answer was based." Later, to provide 
for a report in attributive terms, we changed to the following in- 
structions: "I shall ask you a series of questions. Please give your 
answer as soon as it is ready. After you have answered, report so 
far as possible in attributive terms the experiences upon which the 
answer was based." 

There were five O's, 6 all of whom were graduate students or in- 
structors in psychology; Miss A. H. Sullivan (S), and Messrs. H. 
Sheppard (Sh), M. J. Zigler (Z), H. S. Liddell (L), and L. B. Hois- 
ington (H). Four of these O's, S, Sh, Z and L, worked two periods 
a week; and one, H, worked one period. The observation-periods 
were usually one hour. 

An analysis of the reports shows that imagery was used in 
a number of ways in the solution of the problems. A table 
indicating the different uses and the number of instances 
follows. 





Uses 


Number 


1. 


Anchor 

(a) Illustrative 


136 

5 

31 

10 






1. Memory experience 






(b) Non-illustrative 






(c) Combination of a and b 


182 








2. 


Subject-matter of Problem 

(a) Changing 


155 

57 
9 






(b) Fixed 






(c) Combination of a and b 


221 








3. 


Regulation of Problem 

(a) Formulation 


20 

2 

17 






(b) Anticipation 






(c) Criticism 


39 








4 


Means of Escape from Problem 


5 


5 








F5 


Illustration of the Answer 


16 
5 






(a) Reinforcement 


21 



Total number of reports' = 308. 

In 21 instances the answer came as a sensorimotor response. 



6 Primarily the 'observers' in this study were 'subjects' who were 
performing a set task. We have named them ' observers ' simply be- 
cause our aim was to get them to describe the processes correlated 
with the meaningful stages in the performance of a task. 



COMSTOCK 200 

Illustrations of the different uses taken from the reports 
follow. 

1. Anchor, (a) Illustrative 

Problem 27. If the conductor on an Ithaca street-car rings up in 
one trip 41 fares, how much money has he taken in? 

Report : "As the problem was read through, there was a scrappy 
visual image of something that meant ' conductor ' (upper part of 
him) and of the tally machine at the other end of the car" (H). 7 

1. Memory 

Problem 22. What would you do if a person who you know is crazy 
calls you ugly names? 

Report: Visual image of a man sitting on a rock. It carries the 
meaning of the time when I was very small and one of our neighbors 
went crazy and my father struggled to keep him quiet" (Sh). 

(b) Non-illustrative 

Problem 56. If James had four times as much money as George, 
he would have sixteen dollars. How much money has George? 

Report : " The two names were held by visual-verbal imagery. It 
meant the names ' James ' and ' George ' written in white on a black 
surface. These fluctuated in clearness. Occasionally both were present 
at the same time. They were spatially separated" (Z). 

(c) Combination of (a) and (b) 
Problem 64. What makes salt cake? 

Report: "A visual image of a little pile of white salt. Verbal-motor 
repetition of problem: 'What makes salt cake?'" (Z). 

2. Subject-matter of problem, (a) Changing 

Problem 75. From what other method of transportation are the 
terms used on railroads taken? 

Report: "Visual image of a blue-brownish mass. Meant 'boat.' 
Vanished quickly. Then a visual image of a coach going along a dusty 
road. In verbal-motor imagery the words : ' carriage,' ' coach,' ' pull- 
man '" (L).s 

(b) Fixed 

Problem 25. If the two diagonals of a square are drawn, how 
many triangle are thus formed? 

Report : " Visual image of a square with the diagonals not com- 
pletely filled in. The field is white and the lines black. I saw part 
of all four triangles" (L). 

(c) Combination of (a) and (b) 

Problem 67. Name three countries of Central America. 

Report: "A visual image of a map of South America with its coun- 
tries. Verbal-motor imagery of naming the countries (from the map) 
before I spoke them" (Sh). 

7 Cf. K. Biihler, Uber Gedanken, Arch. f. d. ges. Psych., 9, 1907, 353 ; 
H. J. Watt. Experimented Beitrage zu einer Theorie des Denkens, 
ibid., 4, 1905, 361 ff . ; and A. Messer, Experimentell-psychologische 
Untersuchungen uber das Denken, ibid., 8, 1906, 67 ff. The reports 
cited furnish instances of our ' anchoring ' imagery. 

8 For illustrations of changing imagery cf. A. Messer, op. cit., 57. 



201 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

3. Regulation of problem, (a) Formulation 

Problem 10. A boy was sent to the river to bring back exactly 7 
pints of water. He had a 4 pint vessel and a 9 pint vessel. Show 
how he can measure out exactly 7 pints of water, using nothing but 
these two vessels and not guessing at the amount. 

Report: "A visual image of two vessels, glass. One was half of 
the size of the other. One meant ' 4 ' and the other ' 9.' Then verbal- 
motor imagery meaning: 'You'll have to solve by interchanging in 
two vessels ' " (Z). 

(b) Anticipation 

Problem 68. You say a flock of sheep, but a what of mackerel? 

Report: "A visual image of sheep. Then I anticipated what was 
coming. This was carried by visual imagery of mother's flock of 
white leghorns and verbal-motor imagery in the naming of them" (Z). 

(c) Criticism 

Problem 17. What holiday comes nearest the middle of the year? 
Report : " I thought of Christmas. This was carried by verbal- 
motor imagery" (L). 

4. Means of Escape from the problem 
Problem 70. What is a firkin? 

Report: "I don't know. I thought of Oscar Firkins, a professor 
of English. This was carried by kinaesthetic and verbal-motor imag- 
ery" (S). 

5. Illustration of the answer (coming after the answer) 
Problem 47. Suppose that you are going upstairs in the dark and 

think that there is another step ahead of you. If there isn't, what 
happens? 

Report : " Following the answer I had a visual image of the head 
of the stairs, and of a person there with his head down" (H). 

(a) Reinforcement 

Problem 6. Which is heavier, a pound of lead or a pound of 
feathers ? 

Report : " The problem was solved at the end of the reading. I 
had a visual image of the word ' Neither ' and a period after it. The 
capital ' N ' was typewritten. This came after the answer had been 
given" (L). 

Discussion of Results 

The results show clearly that in the solution of problems 
and the answering of questions our O's had recourse to 
imagery. The most frequently occurring use is, as we might 
expect, that of imagery as the material for working the prob- 
lem. Second in importance is the use of imagery as anchor. 
There were some instances (to be considered later) in which 
no imagery was used in the solution of the problems, but in 
nearly all of these cases the problem was anchored by imagery. 
It seems to be necessary to hold the meaning of the problem, 
or to fix its essential parts in some fashion, in order to answer 
it ; and this is the use made of the anchoring imagery. The 



COMSTOCK 202 

attitudes included under "Regulation of problem" (3) prob- 
ably occurred more frequently than they were reported. They 
are so largely meaningful that the underlying process easily 
escapes report. The meaning here is most often carried by 
verbal-motor imagery, though not infrequently other kinds 
of imagery do the work of formulation; and a visual image 
may correct a mistake or carry an anticipated meaning. 

All of the imagery so far discussed is certainly relevant to 
the thought that it carries. We have, moreover, the statement 
of the O's under the instruction to report " the experiences 
upon which the answer was based." Of a somewhat different 
nature are the five instances in which the imagery was used 
in aiding the to evade the answering of the question. In 
three of the five instances reported the was unable to answer 
the question, and so took refuge in imagery irrelevant to the 
problem-imagery. In the other two cases the answers were 
reached with difficulty, and the O's allowed themselves to be 
side-tracked. We must note, however, that what we find 
here is not irrelevant imagery as such, but rather a shift to 
an attitude which is irrelevant to the problem-solving attitude. 
The imagery is relevant to the alternative attitude. The imag- 
ery which is illustrative of the answer (5) does not, of course, 
help in the solution of the problem. Its use seems to be the 
reassurance of the O that his answer is correct ; and it carries 
in part the meaning of a feeling of satisfaction. In some 
instances it is purely associative. In any case the imagery 
is relevant to the attitude concerned. 

There remain for consideration four phenomena reported 
by the O's. These are : 

No. of cases 

1. A felt need for imagery 6 

2. Imagery as a hindrance 4 

3. Irrelevant imagery 4 

4. Cases in which the answer came immediately and 

automatically 20 

We discuss these in the order above presented. 

1. These instances show the dependence of the O's upon imagery. 
The reports run as follows : a. " I was unable to get the hands of 
the clock changed in my visual image" (L). b. "I wanted to visualize 
and couldn't" (S). c. "This is difficult because I couldn't get a 
picture of the triangle" (Sh). d. "I tried to image the formation 
and couldn't, so that I used my fingers to help me out" (L). e. "I 
tried to visualize some paintings I had seen, and I couldn't" (Z). 
/. " I tried to get a visual image (to anchor the problem) and couldn't " 
(S). In 4 of the 6 instances (c, d, c, f) an incorrect answer or no 
answer at all was given. Of the 2 remaining cases, in b the O finally 
succeeded in evoking a kinaesthetic image which helped in solving the 



203 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

problem ; and in a the O reported that he could not be certain of his 
answer because of the incompleteness of the image which he had to 
use. These instances show that imagery not only is used when it is 
present, but also that its presence may be essential. 

2. There were reported 4 instances in which imagery seemed to 
hinder rather than to help the 0. Interestingly enough, though these 
include the reports of 3 different O's, they are all of the same sort. 
The imagery which is reported as " being in the way " serves in every 
case as the anchor of the problem. Ordinarily, images serving this 
purpose drop out with the beginning of the solution of the problem, 
or become carriers of the processes involved in solving the problem. 
In 3 of the instances the anchoring images had the lure of familiarity, 
and were carriers of experiences more pleasing to the O than the duty 
of answering the question. This seems to be a form of " Means of 
escape from problem" (4). In the other case the could not for a 
long time solve the problem, so that the anchoring imagery, which 
was very complete, was not replaced by any other imagery. 

3. We have included under the heading " Irrelevant imagery " all 
imagery which was reported by the O as having nothing to do with 
the problem which he was solving. Since such reports bear directly 
on our main problem, we shall consider each one separately, a. Prob- 
lem 6. Which is heavier, a pound of lead or a pound of feathers? 
Report: "A visual image of a flock of geese which some of my 
old neighbors used to have. There were several on a large pond and 
some on the bank. One spread out his wings and flapped them. This 
didn't help me solve the problem. The problem was solved at the 
end of the reading and this imagery came after the solution" (Z). 
The concluding statement of the O makes it clear that this is not a 
positive case of irrelevant imagery, but a case in which the imagery 
is relevant to a situation other than that involved in the solution of 
the problem, b. Problem 44. Can more than one meaning be attached 
to a sigh? If so, what meanings? Report: "As the phrase 'attach 
meaning' was completed, I thought of Titchener's 'Beginner's Psy- 
chology.' Then I thought of the next to the last lecture the first 
term. This was carried by visual imagery. . . . All of this bore 
no conscious relation to the answer given. The imagery came before 
the reading of the problem was finished" (L). It is evident that this 
imagery is used as an illustrative anchor which is anticipatory of 
the end of the problem. The last word of the problem, ' sigh,' de- 
manded a shift in attitude so that the imagery reported is relevant to 
the attitude set up by ' meanings attached,' but not to the attitude 
which determines the answer, c. Problem 59. How would you criti- 
cize the following statement made by a judge to a prisoner: "You 
are to be hanged and I hope it will be a warning to you." Report : 
"A visual image of a young man, a round, ruddy lad. This is very 
clear. Other people are in the room. This is in the court-room of 
my home town. I think this is irrelevant [referring to the court- 
room]" (Z). We have here an example of imagery used as illustra- 
tive anchor. The irrelevancy, if there be any, is of the logical sort. d. 
Problem 6. Which is heavier, a pound of lead or a pound of feathers? 
Report : " The first thing that came to me was a remembrance of 
Prof. Angell, in his joking way, proving that psychologically feathers 
are heavier. This is not directly connected with the problem" (Sh). 
Again we find imagery used as an illustrative anchor, here in the 
form of a memory-image. It is difficult to see how this imagery is 
even logically irrelevant, since it obviously gives a clue to the answer- 



COMSTOCK 204 

4. A classification of the questions to which the answers came as 
sensorimotor responses throws light on the reason for this mode of 
response. 

No. 

(a) Comparison problems 4 

(b) Arithmetical problems 3 

(c) Simple Judg. problems 3 

(d) Gen. Informat. problems 6 

(<?) Easy Ingenuity problems 4 

In the comparison problems the answer is dependent upon attention 
to the reading of the problem, for the answer is implicit in the state- 
ment. It may be necessary for some O's to restate the question in 
order to answer it, but for others the auditory perception touches off 
the answer. The questions asked of the types b, c, d, and e are of 
so simple and habitual a sort that the answers, having been previously 
worked out, are " on the tip of the tongue." In other words, all of 
the 20 cases are instances of the presence of brain-habit. 9 As we 
have said above, we frequently find in cases of this kind some anchor- 
ing imagery, but none which is used as material out of which the 
problem is worked ; such imagery is not needed. 

Conclusions 

I. We have shown (1) that, in solving a problem or in 
answering a question, imagery may be used in no less than 
5 different ways; and (2) that in all cases the imagery 
reported is relevant to the thought whose meaning it carries. 

II. During the course of the experiment there became obvi- 
ous many imperfections in the method, which we shall now 
briefly consider. (1) Difficulty in selecting the problems >or 
questions. The selection of problems or questions is by no 
means a simple matter. At first the O's were allowed to 
read the problems and to refer to them in the course of the 
solution. This procedure, however, did not permit of record- 
ing the time taken by the to solve the problem or to answer 
the question. A time-record was deemed desirable as a check 
on the number of processes reported by the 0, since he some- 
times seemed to report experiences occurring, not in his 
solution of the problem, but during the period of introspec- 
tion. We then tried reading the problem to the and taking 
a time-record as described above. This proved to be a better 
procedure, but meant a change in the kind of problem used. 
A problem involving in its statement several terms or different 
steps, or a problem long in general, either could not be com- 
prehended by the or could not be held in mind from a 
single reading. Hence only those problems which could be 
simply and briefly stated and easily grasped could be used. 
Questions of general information were employed with the 

»E, B. Titchener, Thought-Processes.. 1909, 178 fL, 201. 



205 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

hope of meeting this difficulty. It is not easy, nevertheless, 
to find questions which demand thought or present a real 
problem, and at the same time to avoid questions to which 
the answer comes automatically or to which the O can give no 
answer at all. There is, further, the task of selecting prob- 
lems which shall not involve in their solution one type of 
imagery to the exclusion of others. The " clock " problems, 
the " folded and cut " paper problems, and the " box " prob- 
lems are, for example, stated by Terman to test especially the 
ability to visualize. 10 The attempt was made to select prob- 
lems appealing to other types of imagery as well. For ex- 
ample, we hoped that kinaesthetic imagery might be used in 
the solution of problems included in group 7. (2) Difficulty 
in stating the problem. We encountered a further difficulty 
in the statement of the problem. From the reports it was 
evident that the O's were giving experiences set up by the 
descriptive part of the problem as well as those experiences 
upon which the answer was actually based. We were inter- 
ested in the second form of report. To obviate this difficulty 
we tried to state the problems so that the important part for 
the answers should come at the end, as, for example : " What 
is a shoat?" (3) Difficulty occasioned by the influence of the 
experimental attitude on the part of the O. The 0, having 
been informed in the instructions that he was to report the 
experiences upon which his answer was based, seemed in some 
cases to be disturbed by this requirement. This is shown by 
the fact (a) that some O's " pondered " over questions which 
were simple, until there came to report something definite 
in the way of experiences which might underlie an answer 
reached almost immediately. For example, one O in his report 
on a " comparison " problem said : " The word ' oil ' was 
articulated before spoken. I went through the problem in 
internal speech. The answer occurred immediately" (L). 
Yet the time recorded by the stop-watch was 14.4 sec. The 
tendency to wait for something " reportable " is perhaps the 
explanation of some of the illustrative imagery frequently 
reported. Some O's delayed their answers until they were 
" ready to report," explaining the longer time thus required 
for the solution of the problem by remarks such as : "' I was 
trying to think how I got the answer." Such a statement 
shows the honesty of the'O, but makes the time-record value- 
less. The same thing is shown by the fact (b) that some 
O's seemed to keep continually in mind during the solution 

10 L M. Terman, The Measurement of Intelligence, 1916, 321, 328, 
339. 



COMSTOCK 206 

of the problem that they were to report at the end, and accord- 
ingly introspected as they solved the problem. For example, 
one O said: " My introspections in this problem were separate 
from getting the problem. I have to answer the question and 
then go back to introspect" (S). Another illustration of the 
influence of the experimental attitude is the apparent fact 
(c) — E has no experimental proof except the time-records, 
which are otherwise difficult of interpretation — that in re- 
porting the O sometimes added experiences then occurring 
to him, but experiences which were not a part of those upon 
which the answer was based. This, of course, is a trap into 
which it is easy to fall, and which can be avoided only by 
practice. It constitutes, nevertheless, one of the difficulties 
of the method, and involves the danger of assuming that the 
contents of the after-period are the same as those of the ex- 
perimental consciousness. (4) Difficulty in interpreting results. 
The method puts the " burden of proof " upon E. His is the 
final interpretation of results. At best he can only check 
his interpretations by comparing the reports of different O's 
and by repeating experiments. He is also aided by interpreta- 
tions which the O's sometimes " let slip." 

That the method lacks the accuracy of other experimental 
methods is clear. Nevertheless, as a starting-point in an ex- 
perimental investigation, it is valuable. " It will always be 
of service where new ground has to be broken, and where 
the formations are so complex that an immediate recourse 
to experiment in the strict sense is forbidden." 11 

Experiment A. 2. Repetition of Fox's Experiment 

With a view to further study of method and interpretation of 
results we undertook the repetition of an experiment reported by C. 
Fox in the British Journal of Psychology. 12 His problem and method 
bore some resemblances to ours in the experiment described above, 
and we hoped that a comparison of our results (from the repetition 
of the experiment) with his might throw additional light on both 
method and interpretation of results. We shall state briefly his pro- 
cedure and the general results of his experiment and then give the 
conditions of our repetition of the experiment and our results. 

Fox's subjects were told that "they were to investigate the existence 
and importance of thought without images, and to try to find out the 
content of such thinking." 13 They were also " to distinguish, as far as 
they could, between the thinking and the thought." 14 He worked with 

11 E. B. Titchener, The Method of Examination. Am. Jour. Psych., 
24. 1913. 429 ft. 

12 C. Fox, The Conditions which Arouse Mental Images in Thought, 
Brit. Jour. Psych., 6, 1913-14, 420 ff. 

13 Op. cit., 420. 

14 Ibid., 420. 



207 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

15 subjects, all of whom had had "previous practice in introspection." 15 
The material used was 12 statements : 4 involving mathematical con- 
ceptions, 4 historical, 3 grammatical, and 1 a couple of lines from 
Milton. What the instructions were is not clear. We know only 
that "the subjects were told to record on a sheet of paper everything 
they could discover by introspection after each statement had been 
read twice by the experimenter. They were told to put down every- 
thing, however unimportant it appeared to them. ... In fact all 
details, whether mental or physical, were to be noted. They were 
also told to put down first of all whether they realised the meaning 
of the statement read to them ; and as soon as the meaning was realised 
the process of thought which had led to its realisation. If possible 
they were to state what the realisation consisted of ; and whether it 
involved mental images or not. In cases where images did arise 
they were instructed to state whether the realisation of meaning 
preceded or succeeded the occurrence of the mental image." 10 Fox 
states later, however, that " these instructions were only fully carried 
out as regards that part of them which related to the realisation of 
meaning and to the occurrence of images." 17 The general results of 
the experiment he states as follows : " any delay or conflict in con- 
sciousness is a favorable condition for arousing a relevant mental 
image. . . . The experiments also show directly that the contrary 
set of conditions are (sic) unfavorable to the production of images." 18 
In repeating the experiment we used the same material, though the 
statements were read by E only once. Our instructions differed from 
those of Fox in the following respects. (1) We did not tell our O's 
that they were " to investigate the existence and importance of thought 
without images." 19 (2) The reports were made orally by the O's. 
(3) The instructions were less full and suggestive than those used by 
Fox, in accordance with his statement that his own detailed instruc- 
tions " were only fully carried out as regards that part of them which 
related to the realisation of meaning and to the occurrence of 
images." 20 Since we were not certain whether Fox meant the same 
thing when he asked his subjects "to state what the realisation con- 
sisted of" 21 and when he told them to give "the process of thought 
which had led to its realisation," we used two sets of instructions 
which read as follows. (1) "I shall read you a statement. Please 
report whether you realise the meaning of the statement read and, 
if so, report the process of thought which led to its realisation." (2) 
" I shall read you a statement. Please report whether you realise the 
meaning of the statement read and, if so, of what the realisation con- 
sists." The 12 statements of Fox were used as material with the 
first set of instructions; but in order to make a comparable situation 
we were forced to use different statements for the second set of 
instructions. We endeavored, however, to find sentences equal in 
difficulty and similar, so far as possible, to those used by Fox ; that 
is, 4 were mathematical, 4 were historical, etc. We had 5 O's, 3 of 
whom, S, H, and Z, had acted as O's in our first experiment. The 



« Ibid., 


421. 


"'Ibid., 


421. 


"Ibid., 


421. 


18 Ibid., 


430. 


19 Ibid., 


420. 


20 Ibid., 


421. 


21 Ibid., 


, 421. 



COMSTOCK 20S 

other two, Messrs. F. L. Dimmick ^D) and H. G. Bish 
experienced O's. 

Following Fox. we shall present our results for each group of 
statements separately. As stated above, the first set of instructions 
was used with the original material of Fox. We had some dur; 
in the use of these instructions. All of our O's asked what we meant 
by "process of thought." They were told to interpret it as they liked; 
with the result that all took the instructions to mean that a report 
of both process and meaning was desired. We were also questioned 
about the meaning of the words "realise" and " realisation:.*" One O 
(H) said: "To me "realisation' is the concreteness of the situation; 
h is illustrative. I could say "yes as soon as you stop reading: but 
I have a determination to realise the meaning, and this has an in- 
hibitory effect on the * yes.'". Another G _ stated that "verifica- 
tion usually, but not always, seemed itrjr- .tile a third O (D) 

emarked : " I never am aware of the ' realisation.' It is nothing 
but what I talk about after I have finished. It is the attitude of 
accepting or rejecting the meaning." It is obvious that these three 
O's will give i herent kinds of reports. We should expect the first, 
as was actually the case, to report more concrete imagery than the 
other two. Fox's subjects, for the most part, seem to have had no 
difficulties with the instructions. 

We come now to a consideration of the reports on the propositions 
in the first group (mathematical statements "I . From the analysis :: 
his subjects' introspection. Fox draws the following conclusions. 1. 
" In the first place it is perfectly clear that a considerable amount 
of thinking is entirely independent of mental images. Of the 60 
thought-processes of the 15 different subjects _- or 40fc occurred 
without mental imagery-."- 2 Of the 20 thought-processes of our 5 
O's. 2 or lO^c occurred ithout report of mental imagery-, but not 
without observable processes. Such processes ere mainly kmaes- 
thetic sensations of strain around the face and eyes, inhibition of 
breathing, etc. Our O's tended to repeat in verbal-motor imagery the 
proposition after it had been read by the E. It seems strange that 
none of Fix's subjects should have reported a similar tendency. 2. 
"As the statements selected would involve mental images of a very 
simple and definite type, if they occurred, namely of simple geometrical 
figures : and as the frequent mention of images during the experi- 
ment would in itself act as a suggestion to arouse images 
would otherwise not occur, it seems probable that under normal 
conditions of thinking images would not arise in more than 50% 
of the cases."- 3 This is sheer speculation. In the first place one 
cannot foresee what kind of mental images such statements would 
arouse, whether simple and definite or otherwise : nor has one any 
right to assume that "mental images of simple geometrical figures" 
are necessarily easier to call up than images whose complexity 
greater. The fact that the meaning is of simple, geometrical figures 
does not prove that the images, or carrier -s : the meaning, will be 
simple. In the second place Fox criticizes his own procedure when 
he says that the " frequent mention of images during the experiment 

would in itself act as a suggestion to arouse images which would other- 
wise not occur :" since it seems that one aim of an experiment of 
this sort must be to avoid setting up suggestions. Furthermore 

**Ibid., -:; 

- .'bid.. 423 ff. 



209 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

as logical to assume that the statement to the subjects that "they 
were to investigate the existence and importance of thought without 
images " would be as effective in setting up an attitude to report 
thought without images as in arousing the opposite tendency. At any 
rate, it is difficult to see why the suggestion should be valued at 
exactly 10%. 3. " In some cases strong imagery interferes with 
the act of thinking." 24 We found no such cases, though we found 
cases in which inability of the O's to get an image prevented the full 
realisation of the meaning. 4. " Images tend to appear if the realisa- 
tion of the meaning is not at once clear, or if there is a delay or 
a struggle in consciousness." 25 Our results confirm this statement, 
though in the case of our O's verbal-motor imagery, which carries 
the meaning of a debate, is more common than the visual imagery 
reported by Fox's subjects. "Where the meaning is easily grasped 
or where assent has been previously given there seems to be no 
tendency to embody the thought in an image." 26 Though such instances 
are rare with our O's, the assent or the realisation of meaning is car- 
ried by kinaesthesis of some sort. 5. " Suspension of judgment and 
doubt, both of which may be regarded as instances of delay or strug- 
gle in consciousness, are conditions which facilitate the emergence 
of mental images." 27 As we have already said, such attitudes were 
for our O's characterised on the processual side by verbal-motor imag- 
ery, other modes of imagery, and kinaesthetic and organic sensations, 
together with feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Although 
Fox had instructed his subjects to note "muscular strain or tension," 28 
no mention is made of it in the quoted reports. 

The introspective reports for the remaining 3 groups of statements 
confirm, on the whole, both Fox's results and our own as stated above. 
1. He says, in discussing the propositions of the second group: "If 
a subject makes a deliberate attempt to concentrate his attention on 
the meaning of a statement he may succeed in suppressing images 
which would otherwise occur." 29 This remark seems beside the point; 
for the fact that no images are reported because of " attention on the 
meaning " does not prove that images were not present and were not 
carriers of the reported meaning. Furthermore, this is a particular 
set assumed by one O, and its assumption is not justified by the in- 
structions. 2. " Emphasis or a pause which constitutes a break in the 
free flow of thinking is favorable to the production of imagery. 
This condition, too, seems to fit in with the general idea 
of a conflict or struggle . . . ." 30 The introspective reports in 
question refer to a proposition of group 2 (historical). Fox says: 
" In reading this sentence a distinct pause was made after the words 
' mechanical inventions.' " 31 An emphasis or a pause probably is 
favorable to the production of imagery; but this does not seem to be 
analogous to a conflict or struggle. On the other hand, it is quite 
possible for a pause to arouse a mental image which does not accord 
with the further meaning of the statement; in which case it certainly 



24 Ibid., 


424. 


2r ' Ibid. 


424. 


20 Ibid., 


424. 


27 Ibid. 


, 424. 


28 Ibid., 


421. 


29 Ibid., 


, 426. 


30 Ibid., 


427. 


31 Ibid., 


426. 



COMSTOCK 1210 

would not be used as are the images which appeal as the result oi a 
conflict. For example, in reporting on this same sentence, 
our O's y~H.} said: "'Mechanical inventions' gave rise to aud 
imagery meaning ' Edison ' and visual imagery in greys oi different 
brightness that meant "transportation' or 'industrial activity.' I 
seemed to have settled the thing until the word * England ' came. 
With this the visual image dropped out Then an auditory image 
of the word 'England' that meant to assure myself of what you 
said. Then followed a bi: of visual imagery in greys that 
referred to conditions in England and meant the translation 
oi the previous meaning from this country to England."' 3. 
"A strong image may obstruct the attempt to understand."* 3 
Fox does not detine ' strong." so that we do not know whether he 
refers to clearness, or to details, or to stability and duration. His 
illustrations of "certain cases" in which the image obstructs under- 
standing do not, however, seem conclusive. In any case they do not 
e. as perhaps they are not intended to prove, that thought may 
re imageless. 0::e of Fox's subjects reverts: "When i tried t; 
realise the significance of the statement it was twice obstructed : at 
first by the picture of my old history room at school, then by my 
history book open at the page on feudalism."' This seems to be 
an example of our anchoring imagery. It is true, of course, that 
attention to these images for themselves would involve a shift in 
attitude, and that they would thus trove an obstruction to realisation 
o: meaning. 4. I:: considering the propositions of the third group, 
Fox states that "prompt and thorough understanding coincides with 
the absence of images." 84 This is evidenced by the reports of three 
subjects of whom Fox say?: "Three subjects obtained what may be 
iescribed as an associative image, namely an image not directly 
called up by the lines but evoked y association with their meaning. 
In these cases the image was that of a book on education in 
a similar doctrine to that expressed in the lines was discussed. Xow 
those who had these images must have realised the meaning before 
the images came, since such images v end on understanding the 
meaning." 5 " Hence he concludes that these three subjects realised 
the meaning of the statement without the aid of images. We have 
not the introspective reports for reference, and it may be that these 
present evidence that the images were associative. From what Fox 
tells us. however, it does not seem necessarily true that "those who 
had these images must have realised the meaning before the images 
came, since such images depend on understanding the meaning." It 
seems quite possible that the image of " a book on education " might 
have carried the meaning of the lines instead of being dependent on 
them. In conclusion Fox states: "The experiments show that any 
delay or conflict in consciousness is a favorable condition for arousing 
a relevant mental image, that is. one that will in some way tend to 
help towards a cessation of the conflict All the other conditions 
which we have found to be suitable for stimulating the production 
oi mental images are reducible to this general formula. . . . The 
experiments also show directly that the contrary set of conditions are 
(sic) unfavorable to the production of images. Thorough or imme- 

" Ibid., 427. 

33 lb : 427 

**Ib ; ,d.. 42^. 

' Ibid., 429. 



211 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

diate understanding, an easily grasped conception, ready assent to a 
proposition, straightforward or unimpeded reasoning, are all cases 
in which, as a general rule, images play no part. Further, concen- 
tration of thought on meaning is unfavorable to the stimulation of 
mental imagery, but this cannot be brought easily under the above 
general formula." 30 We agree with Fox's statement with respect to 
the conditions favorable for arousing mental imagery. We cannot, 
however, fully accept his statement of conditions unfavorable to the 
stimulation of imagery. "Thorough or immediate understanding." 
as in cases where the propositions come to the labeled " You've 
accepted me before," may be explained by the operation of brain- 
habit, so that no imagery would be needed. In " straightforward or 
unimpeded reasoning " it seems probable that, the attention being on 
meaning, the processes might be overlooked. Of the 60 thought- 
processes of our 5 O's, only 3 or 5% occurred without imagery. We 
are, accordingly, inclined to believe that, in some at least of the situa- 
tions mentioned by Fox as unfavorable to the production of imagery, 
the imaginal content was overlooked, so quick is the process of thought 
and so completely is the attention of the subject likely to be con- 
centrated on meaning. We have a parallel case in the neglect of 
after-images and double images in everyday experiences when other 
things are in the focus of attention. We should, therefore, agree 
with Fox's last statement (if we may change the word ' stimulation ' 
to. 'report') that "concentration of thought on meaning is unfavor- 
able to the report of mental imagery." 

The general results of the experiments in which we used the second 
set of instructions and material similar to the statements of Fox 
may be briefly mentioned. With the exception of one O, D, these 
instructions were interpreted as calling for a report both of meaning 
and of process. This O persisted in his statement that he was never 
" aware of the realisation " and so could not report on it. The reports 
with these instructions were much less full, and the use of the 
expression " of what the realisation consists " seemed to throw the 
emphasis on meaning rather than on process. One O (as we have 
reported above) said: "To me realisation means a sort of accept- 
ance or approval of the meaning." If Fox's subjects interpreted his 
instructions in this way, it is evident that they were set to report 
meaning and not process ; so that images, although present, may 
easily have been overlooked. 

Two things may be learned from the repetition of this experi- 
ment: (1) the necessity of phrasing instructions carefully and ac- 
curately; (2) the need for as flexible and unbiased an interpretation 
of results as possible. 

Experiment B. 1. Likenesses and Differences 

Our problem remained the same as in Experiment A. In 
considering the results of this experiment we discussed some 
of the difficulties encountered in arranging" material and de- 
termining procedure. In -Experiment B we tried to overcome 
some of these difficulties. Our material consisted of paired 
words whose relations to each other with respect to likeness, 
difference, etc., the O's were to give. It may be remembered 

36 Ibid., 430 ff. 



COMSTOCK 



212 



that we found that one of the sources of error in the material 
used in Experiment A was the lengthy statement of the prob- 
lem. We hoped that the series of paired words would elim- 
inate this difficulty; the question asked in the instructons 
would finally be present only as a set, and the statement of 
the problem would be reduced to two words. It seemed also 
that this type of material might be a halfway house between 
the " wordy " problem and the single word-stimulus. 

The O was seated with his back to E, and was instructed to keep 
his eyes closed during the reading of the paired words and the deter- 
mination of the answer. The instructions were as follows : " I shall 
present to you a series of paired words and I want you to tell me 
in what respect the members of each pair differ from each other. 
After you have done this, please describe as well as you can the 
experiences upon which your differentiation was based." Three series 
of 15 paired words each were used. The two words were read to 
the O; the stop-watch was started as the last word was spoken by 
E and stopped as soon as O gave his answer. The following are 
typical of the paired words used; cut-scratch, education-culture, pos- 
sible-practicable, Dickens-Scott. There were five O's. Two of these, 
Z and H, had worked in Experiment A. The others were Miss R. 
Stutsman (St), and Messrs. P. Cavanaugh (C) and E. Tolman (T). 
C had had some training in observation, but St and T were untrained. 
The experiment covered a period of two weeks. At the end of this 
time the O's were asked to give likenesses instead of differences, and 
the instructions were changed accordingly. Thirty pairs of words, 
such as memory-imagination, water-air, nymph-mermaid, were used. 



Uses 


Number of Cases 




a 

57 
18 
12 


b 

93 

24 
8 


c 
6 


d 

12 

2 


e 


1. Anchor 

(a) Illustrative 


7 


(b) Non-illustrative 




(c) Combination of a and b 


1 






2. Subject-matter of Problem 

(a) Changing 


42 
6 


90 
3 
1 


12 


16 
6 


1? 


(b) Fixed 




(c) Combination of a and b 








3. Regulation of Problem 

(a) Formulation 


9 
2 


8 
3 






9 


(b) Anticipation 




(c) Criticism 








4. Means of Escape from Problem 












5. Illustration of the Answer 


6 
3 


3 






2 


(a) Reinforcement 





a, b, etc., at the head of the Table, refer to the relationships listed on 
p. 213. 



213 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

The experiment covered a period of a week. In order to eliminate 
certain difficulties, which we shall discuss later, we again changed 
the material and instructions. We still used paired words, but words 
which stood in various relations to each other. The instructions 
were : " I shall read you 2 words. You are to tell in what respect 
(a) they are like each other, (b) they differ from each other, (c) 
one is dependent upon the other, (d) one is convertible into the other, 
(e) one affects the other. After you have given your answer, please 
describe the experiences upon which the answer was based." Before 
pronouncing the 2 words, E indicated the relation between them to 
be given by O. The following are typical of the paired words used 
in this series: hypothesis-law (convertible), democracy-education 
(affect), capital-labor (dependent). The experiment lasted 2 weeks 
and with one exception (H) the O's were the same as before. 

We give first a classification of the imagery used in deter- 
mining the various relations between the paired words. 

The types of imaginal experience upon which the differen- 
tiations were based are : 

1. Two images which may be present (a) simultaneously, (b) suc- 
cessively, (c) successively with a recurrence of the first image. Num- 
ber of instances=104. 

Stimulus : egg-stone. Report : "One is breakable, the other breaks. 
There was a scrappy bit of visual imagery, vague. It carried the 
meaning of falling and breaking. Over against that was a kinaesthetic 
image in the throat. It carried the meaning of hard, something that 
wouldn't break" (H). 

2. Two images may be present and the basis for differentiation be 
carried by the second. Number of instances=13. 

Stimulus : stumble-fall. Report : " To fall is to go clear to the 
ground. A visual image of myself stumbling on a brick walk. I 
was leaning forward. There was a weak kinaesthetic image in my 
chest and shoulders and a motor image in my toe. Then the word 
'fall' came. With this there came, in just a flash, a visual image of 
a man lying on the ground. Then the difference came ; to fall is to 
go clear to the ground" (Z). 

3. One or two images may be present, the differentiation being made 
in verbal-motor imagery. Number of instances=27. 

Stimulus: cook-fry. Report: "You boil in water, but you fry in 
grease. I had a visual image of something frying in a skillet. With 
' cook ' there was a visual image of a pot. I was trying to get at 
something in the pan and pot to differentiate them. This was in 
verbal-motor imagery: 'You don't fry in water'" (Z). 

4. There may be a visual schema, accompanied or unaccompanied 
by anchoring images. Number of instances=15. 

Stimulus: radical-progressive. Report: "A radical person has less 
sense than a progressive person. A visual image in dark grey of the 
two words written out on a neutral grey background. ' Radical ' 
was above ' progressive.' At that point there was no difference. Then 
' radical ' moved rapidly to the right. The right meant ' ahead of,' 
' away from,' or ' his going too far ahead to be sensible.' All this 
touched the answer off" (C). 



COMSTOCK 214 

5. There may be two modalities carrying the meaning of the first 
stimulus-word, the differentiation being based on the absence of one 
of the modalities in the imagery carrying the meaning of the second 
stimulus-word. Number of instances=7. 

Stimulus : fry-cook. Report : " The difference is auditory. With 
' fry ' I had a vague visual image which meant a frying pan with 
meat on a gas-plate. This was very scrappy, and was accompanied 
by a clearer auditory image of equal intensity. With ' cook ' there 
was a vague visual image of a pot. I saw nothing cooking in it, though 
the meaning was there. The auditory image was lacking here, and 
this lack forced the first difference" (H). 

6. There may be verbal-motor imagery accompanied by illustrative 
imagery. Number of instances=3. 

Stimulus : powerless-weak. Report : " You may have a little power 
and be weak, but if you have no power you can't do anything. I was 
at sea for a while. Then I thought (verbal-motor imagery) ' They're 
absolutely synonymous, but she asked for a difference.' Then I thought 
of an engine, an automobile engine, powerless ; then of an engine 
running very weakly (visual imagery) and then came in the con- 
crete experience which was the basis of differentiation" (Z). There 
were reported 3 instances in which the differentiations were based 
on different feelings (pleasantness and unpleasantness) set up by the 
two stimulus words ; two instances in which the differentiation was 
based on two different sensations ; and two in which it was based 
on a difference between image and sensation. 

The types of imaginal experiences upon which the likenesses 
were based are : 

1. Two images may be present (a) simultaneously, (b) successively, 
the likeness being determined by the presence of one or more similar 
qualities in the two images, or by full similarity, or by eye-movement 
from the one image to the other ; or the answer may be set off imme- 
diately. 37 Number of instances=42. 

2. There may be two images, the first of which carries the meaning 
of a superordinate class. Number of instances=16. 

Stimulus : purple-orange. Report : " Both are colors. After the 
stimulus ' purple ' I had a visual image of a patch of dark purple. 
With ' orange ' the verbal-motor image ' color ' came. The purple 
image meant ' color,' so that when ' orange ' came I could give ' color ' 
at once " (Z). 38 

3. There may be a visual schema. Number of instances=3. 

4. There may be anchoring imagery together with verbal-motor imag- 
ery. Number of instances=12. 

5. Illustrative imagery may follow or accompany a response given 
immediately. Number of instances=9. 

Stimulus: apple-ball. Report: "Both are round. As soon as E 
had said ' apple-ball,' ' round ' came. After I had made my decision 
visual images of 'apple' and 'ball' came" (Z). 

37 Illustrations will be given only in cases in which the types of 
experience differ from those reported for the differentiations. 

38 Cf. the " iibergeordneten Begriff " of A. Messer, Experimentell- 
psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das Denken, Arch. f. d. ges. 
Psych., 8, 1906, 78. 



215 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

The analysis of the experiences upon which the determina- 
tions of the other kinds of relations were based showed no 
new types of imaginal experiences. 

Conclusions 

I. We have obtained in this experiment further evidence 
of the importance of imagery. Although we reduced our 
problems to lowest terms, imagery was needed. Almost as 
important as the imagery is the part played by the " set " 
produced by the instructions. It will doubtless have been 
observed in the giving of both likenesses and differences that 
the presence of two images carrying the meanings of the 
stimulus-words was not enough in itself to touch off the 
answer. The determination to report a difference or a like- 
ness was the essential thing. This is especially noticeable 
in the case of the differentiations. 

II. Our material and procedure in this experiment were 
arranged with a view to eliminating some of the difficulties 
found in Experiment A. (1) Material. The shortened state- 
ment of the problem avoided the setting up of imagery present 
in the reading of a longer problem, and focused the attention 
on the question itself. This is clearly advantageous. On the 
other hand, unless the stimulus-words are chosen with care, 
much less thought is required than in the case of the problems. 
The acquisition of a set for a superordinate concept, as was 
the case with the likenesses, made O's task considerably easier. 
The simplicity or perhaps the uniformity of presentation of 
the material seemed to make possible a fixed kind of reaction 
to it. The generality of the instructions permitted super- 
ficial answers and, accordingly, less thought on the part of O. 
The demand for a more fundamental likeness or difference 
meant the suppression of the first answer that came and the 
search for a second ; all of which would increase the task 
of report. (2) The task of the experimenter. In the inter- 
pretation of results E's work was much easier with the use 
of this material. The reports of the O's were briefer and 
seemed to be more accurate and complete. The O's were 
often able to say with reference to a specific process : " It 
was this that carried the meaning of likeness," thus marking 
it off from the other processes reported. If the O's are to 
be trusted, £'s burden is appreciably lightened. (3) The in- 
fluence of the experimental attitude upon the O's. We have 
already mentioned the fact that O, knowing he has to report 
his experiences, may be set to think in imaginal terms to a 
greater extent than is usual with him. Indeed, one of our 



COMSTOCK 216 

O's, after having given a full report of the imagery used in 
making a differentiation, said: " If I were asked on the street 
to give the difference between " old " and " obsolete," I think 
that the thing would go off in verbal terms." This remark 
led us to undertake our next experiment. 

Experiment B. 2. Experiment Under Xon-Laboratory Conditions 

We wished to find to what extent imagery is present as a basis for 
answering questions when the questions are not a part of a laboratory 
exercise. In other words, we wanted to catch our O's without the 
experimental attitude upon them, and without the knowledge that 
they would be asked to give " the experiences upon which the answer 
was based." Outside of observation-hours questions such as would 
arise naturally in the course of a conversation were asked casually. 
When the " O " had as casually answered, we asked him if there were 
any imagery present as the basis of his answer. We have 29 reports 
from 5 of our regular O's, Z, H, B, D, and S; and 4 reports from 
persons having no training in psychology. These reports are, of 
course, necessarily incomplete : but with only 3 exceptions there was 
reported imagery of some kind upon which the answer was based. 
In 2 of the 3 exceptions kinaesthesis was reported; and in the case of 
the remaining exception the subject stated that the answer came 
automatically. We give an illustration of the procedure used. The 
" E " and the " O " were talking about Stout and his books. O was 
asked what Stout had written, and replied : " He wrote a couple of 
books that I know of and he stands for the theory of conation." E 
then asked : " Did you have any imagery when you answered my 
question?" The answer follows: "Yes. I had a visual image of the 
titles of the books and of their covers. I also saw printed, as if an 
excerpt from a book, the word ' conative.' " This group of experi- 
ments shows that imagery is of frequent occurrence in everyday think- 
ing. The high percentage of cases in which imagery was reported is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that 5 of the 7 persons questioned were 
trained O's. The demand for a report under these conditions implies 
a quick shift from a logical to a psychological attitude, of which 
only trained O's are capable. It is clear, then, that a good deal of 
imagery is present in thinking, and that its presence is not solely 
the result of laboratory conditions. 

Experiment C 

Our experiments in thinking gave us no instances of irrele- 
vant material. Though we had been attacking our problem 
on the side of relevancy, we had expected to get at irrelevancy 
indirectly. It seemed best now to concern ourselves directly 
with irrelevancy. We began this section of our experimental 
work with experiments at the perceptive level, resembling 
everyday experiences. Each one of the situations in these 
experiments included an irrelevant factor. We wished to ob- 
tain a description of consciousness at the instant when the 
irrelevant factor appeared in the situation. 



217 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

There were 3 parts of the experiment. (1) We set the O's simple 
tasks into each one of which an irrelevant factor was introduced. At 
the appearance of the irrelevancy we interrupted the O in his task, 
and asked him to describe his experiences at the moment of inter- 
ruption. There were 4 tasks of this sort: (a) the sorting, according 
to 3 presented samples, of buttons drawn from a bag in which was 
one button unlike any of the samples; (b) the sorting, according to 
the arrangement of holes punched in them, of cards taken from a 
piled pack, one of which was different from all the others; (c) the 
arranging, in order of preference, of samples of cloth pasted on paper, 
among which there was an oblong of paper with no cloth on it; (d) 
the presentation, for brief study, of a picture about which were 
later asked questions one of which had nothing to do with the sub- 
ject-matter of the picture. The instructions were: "Here are 3 
buttons, and others of the same sort are mixed up in the bag. You 
are to put your hand in the bag and, taking out one at a time, arrange 
them in piles according to the samples shown. When I say ' Now,' 
you are to drop the task if it is still incomplete and describe your 
experiences at the moment of interruption." The first part of the 
instructions was changed to suit the nature of the task, but the latter 
part remained the same for all 4 tasks. The time was taken with a 
stop-watch chiefly in order to hold the O strictly to his task. 

(2) The material for the second part of the experiment was a 
paragraph the latter part of which was entirely irrelevant to the 
beginning. The irrelevant part was begun on the last line of a sheet 
of paper so that the O was obliged to turn to the second sheet to 
continue his reading. This arrangement had the double advantage 
of preventing the reader from glancing ahead to the irrelevant part, 
and of letting E know when to interrupt. The instructions were : 
" I shall give you a paragraph which I want you to read carefully 
enough to give its contents after reading. When I say ' Now,' you 
are to drop the task if it is still incomplete, and describe your experi- 
ences at the moment of interruption." (3) The material for the third 
part of the experiment consisted of 4 paragraphs which contained 
such errors as : repetitions, omissions, misspellings, transpositions, and 
omission of punctuation. The instructions were : " I shall give you 
a short paragraph which you are to read carefully. After you have 
finished your reading, you are to give a summary of the paragraph." 
After the had read and reported on all 4 of the paragraphs, he 
was asked if he had noted any errors of form, and if so to describe 
his experiences when he noted them. Only one of the foregoing 
experiments took place in any one observation-hour, and it either 
preceded or followed other experimental work. There were 5 O's, 
3 of whom, H, S, and Z, had observed in Experiments A and B ; and 
2 of whom, B and D, had observed only in the repetition of Fox's 
experiment. 

Sorting Problems 

Three of the tasks ,(1 («), (&)> (c)) were of the same 
general nature, i.e., sorting problems. The reports show the 
presence of 4 stages in the realisation of irrelevancy: 

1. Perception (usually tactual), accompanied by immediate judg- 
ment of difference and supplemented by imagery; 

2. Visual perception of difference; 



COMSTOCK 218 

3. Feeling component: 

(a) Astonishment ) Analyzable into kinaesthetic sensa- 

(b) Surprise and wonder >- tions, affective processes, and imag- 

(c) Indecision ) ery 

4. Reaction : 

(a) Immediate (directed by determining tendency) ; 

(b) Mediate (verbal-motor imagery). 

We give a report of the experiences described in the per- 
formance of one of the tasks. " First a cutaneous perception 
which was different from the preceding one ; the pressure was 
much heavier. There was a brief snatch of visual imagery 
which went with this cutaneous pressure sensation and car- 
ried the meaning of the type of button and the fact that it 
was different. I think I verbalised this as : 'I wonder what 
this is.' Added to this was the perception of the visual black 
[the odd button was black], and then without consciously 
intending to do anything, I threw it outside. The kinaesthetic 
process and the perception of throwing brought the meaning 
of rejection" (D). In the case of some of the other O's the 
feeling-part of the experience was more marked. It was 
always present, and seems to be characteristic of the appear- 
ance of the irrelevant component of the situation. 

The sorting of cards, as an experience containing an ir- 
relevancy, was a failure. The card which differed in the 
arrangement of its punched holes from the other cards was 
in no case perceived as different, the difference apparently 
being so slight as to be overlooked. The reports on this situ- 
ation are, however, valuable; they show the difference be- 
tween a situation containing an irrelevant factor and one 
containing only relevant factors. We find reports of stage 
2, the visual perception of difference, and of stage 4, the 
reaction. In this perception there was no tactual element, 
for the ' feel,' in general, of all the cards was the same. The 
significant thing is the absence of the feeling-component. Of 
importance, also, is the fact that in all cases the reaction was 
immediate, never mediate. 

Reading Problem: Irrelevant Meanings 

In their reports on the second part of the experiment, in 
which the material was the single paragraph, all O's noted the 
" meaninglessness " of the irrelevant part. The absence of 
meaning was accompanied by feelings of strangeness, con- 
fusion, puzzlement, etc. The meaning of irrelevancy was car- 
ried by pressure sensations (staring at the page), muscular 
tension (an attempt to hold the meaning together), and verbal- 



219 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

motor imagery, which usually expressed an attempt to force 
a relationship to the preceding part of the paragraph. 

Reading Problem: Typographical Errors 

In the third part of the experiment we set our O's too diffi- 
cult a task. They could not give a report of processes, even 
when they had noted errors, so long after the observation 
had taken place. The difficulty was further increased by 
the set for relevant meanings. It should be said, however, 
that we were aware of the difficulty of this task; we had 
wished to arrange an everyday situation, like the reading 
of a newspaper, in which the irrelevancies should be com- 
monplace. One noticed no errors and said reproachfully 
when asked to report : " I didn't notice any errors ; I wasn't 
set for proof-reading " (Z). The 4 other O's remembered 
and reported mistakes in the paragraphs, but 2 of them 
could give no report of process because they had not taken 
the attitude for report. The third 0, H, reported that he 
ignored the errors as he read, " for he was reading for thought 
rather than for grammar." He mentioned, however, a ten- 
dency to read aright in auditory imagery the mistakes, and 
also some verbal-motor imagery carrying the meaning of 
errors. The fourth O, B, reported verbal-motor imagery 
carrying the meaning of annoyance at writing so carelessly 
done by E. 

Conclusions 

We have seen that a marked irrelevancy is characterized 
by feeling accompanying the inhibition set up ; and that where 
the irrelevancy is less marked, it tends to be overlooked be- 
cause of the set for relevant meanings. 

Experiment D. 1. Pictures 

In Experiment C we began to study irrelevancy directly. 
We arranged situations containing irrelevancies on the per- 
ceptive level, and we secured an analysis of the situations 
from our O's. From these analyses we found that when an 
irrelevancy appeared in a situation it was accompanied by 
" feelings." We wished .now to find out whether such feel- 
ings might be the criteria of the entrance of irrelevant imag- 
ery into an imaginal situation. To this end we had to ar- 
range a situation in which there should be some imagery 
irrelevant to it ; as, for example, the black button was irrele- 
vant to the other buttons in the bag. We wanted, with our 



COMSTOCK 220 

O's set for imagery, to have a complex background of imag- 
ery upon which they could draw. To secure this we used 
3 kinds of material and procedure. 

1. We presented to O a series of 12 pictures, mainly narrative, 
brightly colored, and varying in size from 6 by 8 inches to 12 by 
16 inches. The instructions were: "I shall show you a picture for 
a short period. Please observe it carefully. At the end of this period 
you will be allowed two minutes in which to write a description of 
the picture, giving its title." The O's were seated in front of a grey 
screen upon which was mounted one of the pictures. The picture 
was at first covered by a curtain, which was raised just after the 
" ready " signal and let fall after an exposure of 15 seconds. This 
procedure took one observation-hour. At the beginning of the next 
observation-period we gave the O the following instructions : " I shall 
name to you one of the pictures that you learned last time. When 
you hear the name, I want you to recall the picture as vividly as 
possible. Three seconds after I have named the picture I shall read 
you a simple problem which you are to solve as quickly as possible. 
Say ' Yes ' when you have solved it, and then begin to report as fully 
as you can the course of your experiences during the experiment." 
After each one of the pictures had been presented once for recall, 
they were presented again in a different order, and followed by dif- 
ferent problems. 

2. The material for the second part of the experiment was put in 
the form of a completion-test. We took from various books descrip- 
tive paragraphs having the following titles : " The Mountains of the 
Desert," " Rules of Hunting among the Greenlanders," " Daybreak " 
(poetry), "A Japanese Garden," "The Winter Dwellings of the 
Esquimaux," and "A Simple Chronoscope." Several words, including 
all parts of speech, were omitted from these paragraphs. The was 
given the following instructions : " I shall give you a paragraph in 
which some of the words are missing. You are to fill in the blank 
spaces, each of which indicates an omitted word. You will be given 
a certain length of time in which to do this. At the end of this time 
I shall say ' Now ' and read you a problem which you are to solve. 
After you have given your answer, report all of your experiences 
from the reading of the problem to the giving of the answer." No 
fixed period of time was allowed for filling in the words of the para- 
graph. The O was interrupted in his task when he was seen to be 
near the end of the paragraph. 

3. The material for this part of the experiment consisted of 3 
separate words. For the most part the words all referred to a single 
situation as crowd — touchdown — cheers ; though there were a few 
cases in which the 3 words might set up different trains of thought, 
as for example turkey — star — electric. The instructions show the pro- 
cedure. " I shall read you 3 words. Give yourself passively to any 
imagery that comes. After 15 seconds, I shall read you a problem 
which you are to solve and report on in the regular way." O was 
seated with his back to E and with his eyes closed. There were in 
the three parts of Experiment D 5 O's, all of whom had served in the 
other experiments. 

In the first part of the experiment we endeavored to supply 
the O with a background of imagery upon which should be 



221 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

impinged a problem to be solved. We desired, of course, to 
know what happened to this imagery when the problem came. 
We shall refer to the imagery called up by the O in this part 
of the experiment as the picture-imagery, since it was deter- 
mined by the previous presentation of pictures. An analysis 
of the reports of the 5 O's shows that the picture-imagery may 
behave in at least 3 different ways. 

(1) It may drop out at the beginning of the reading of the problem, 
either suddenly or gradually. 

Report: "The first imagery (picture-imagery) came quite quickly, 
so that when I repeated the name of the picture, it was there almost 
immediately. In quality it was greyish and reddish. It lacked a 
background. Then began the reading of the problem, and there was 
with it rather good visual imagery of trees. Somewhere here the 
first imagery went out" (D). 

(2) It may remain during the reading of the problem, in which case 
the problem is (a) not sensorily clear, (b) not cognitively clear, (c) 
neither sensorily nor cognitively clear, and the picture-imagery loses 
in clearness, detail, meaningfulness ; or there is a fluctuation in clear- 
ness between the picture-imagery and the problem, in which both seem 
equally insistent in turn. 

Report : " The auditory stimulus (name of picture) carried the 
meaning of familiarity and with this there was a visual image of 
the bird sitting on a post out in Oregon where I knew the bird. 
Then quickly came the image of the picture as seen. The image 
was intense and rich in detail. Then the problem came. It was a 
sensation without meaning. The association with the bird persisted ; 
its song came in auditory imagery and a visual image that meant 
' bird ' persisted all the time that the words of the problem were 
coming. It was there until nearly the end of the reading. During the 
last part of the reading the attention was on the auditory sensation 
more than on the meaning. Then an auditory image that meant the 
whole problem repeated twice. By this time the ' bird ' was pushed 
aside and the attention was on the problem. The meaning of the 
problem became clear cognitively" (H). 

(3) It may remain or may recur during the reading of the problem 
and be illustrative of it. 

Report: "The auditory sensation of 'The Line Up' (the name of 
the picture) brought a visual image that meant the picture. It was 
rich in color-meaning. At first the auditory sensations were very 
obscure, not cognised. At the third word there was touched off a 
determination to solve the problem, and the visual imagery dropped 
right out. With the word 'cloth' (word of the problem) there was 
a recurrence of a bit of the picture-imagery meaning the red shawl 
on the man's back. From there on there was a determination to 
listen to the problem" (H). 

What happens to the picture-imagery is obvious. Where 
it is irrelevant, it drops out ; where it can be used, — that is, 
where it becomes relevant, — it remains. It is true that it may 
not drop out all at once ; but in that: case it interferes with 
the grasping of the statement of the problem, as well as 



COMSTOCK 222 

being interfered with in its turn by the problem. There is 
a struggle between the two for the field of attention, and 
now the one and now the other is clear. There is, more- 
over, no awareness of irrelevancy so far as the picture- 
imagery is concerned. The irrelevant factor here is the audi- 
tory perception of the problem, and we find its appearance 
characterised in much the same way as was the appearance 
of the black button. For example, one reports : " I couldn't 
shake the picture out of my mind (when the problem came). 
There was muscular tension and internal speech while I was 
trying to get my bearings. There was strain around the eyes, 
discomfort, and unpleasantness" (B). This is evidently our 
feeling-component of Experiment C; but here, as there, it is 
characteristic of a perception, not of an image. We have 
another kind of situation when the imagery remains or recurs 
during the reading of the problem. In this case the shift 
from the picture-imagery-awareness to the problem-aware- 
ness has been made. In two of the three reported instances 
of this sort the picture-imagery has entirely faded out, and 
recurs only to carry the meaning, in an illustrative fashion, of 
part of the problem. It is to be noted that only that part of 
the picture-imagery which is relevant to the problem-meaning 
recurs ; the whole of the image does not come back. We have 
thus succeeded in giving our O's a background of imagery, 
and they draw upon this where they can; for the rest, it 
disappears. In the third instance included under this head- 
ing, the picture-imagery remained during the reading of the 
problem. It began, however, to lose in detail, and now one 
part and then another of the visual image was clear. The 
problem was lacking in cognitive clearness. The first word 
of the problem to be comprehended was the word ' trees ' which 
the O said " persisted " and was related to a tree in the visual 
image. What we have here is a reinforcement of the problem- 
meaning by a part of the picture-imagery. After this the pic- 
ture-imagery dropped out and the problem became clear. 
There remain for consideration 3 cases in which the problem- 
imagery was superposed on the picture-imagery. These we 
shall discuss along with the results of the third part of the 
experiment. 

Experiment D. 2. Completion-Tests 

We expected in this part of the experiment, as in the pre- 
ceding part, that the O's might be " revelling in imagery " 
when the problem came ; and we hoped that they might have 
recourse to imagery in their attempts to fill in the blanks 



223 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

in the completion-test. We interrupted them just before the 
paragraph was completed, so that any imagery present should 
have been at its richest. An analysis of the reports shows 
the experiences of the O's when the problem came and the 
effect of the previous task on the problem. 

1. There may be a complete and immediate shift in attitude from 
the completion-test to the problem. 

Report : " In the paragraph the first blank was a nuisance to me. 
I was tired of the test and in a sort of careless attitude so that when 
the problem came I was glad; and the test dropped out entirely" (Z). 

2. There may be between the test-attitude and the problem-solving- 
attitude a state characterised by the O's as " a period of cognitive 
blankness " or as " a chaotic consciousness." 

Report : "Consciousness was chaos at first. There was a series 
of auditory sensations having no meanings" (S). 

3. The test-attitude, carried by (a) visual imagery, (b) kines- 
thetic imagery or kinaesthetic sensation, renders the problem sensorily 
unclear, cognitively unclear, or both. 

Report: "Visual imagery (from the completion-test) was present 
when you started reading the problem. As the problem was read I 
turned sharply toward you, meaning that I was going to pay atten- 
tion. The first part of the statement came merely as auditory sen- 
sation and without specific meaning, though with the meaning ' here is 
the problem.' There was a reference back to the paragraph carried 
in kinaesthetic sensation ; a tendency to turn the head back. Then 
there was verbal-motor imagery of parts of the problem and some 
visual imagery" (D). 

4. The imagery used in the completion-test may hang over or recur 
during the reading of the problem, in which case the problem is sen- 
sorily and cognitively unclear or is not heard. The results of this 
experiment show that the conditions set are not conducive to the 
" carrying-over " of imagery from one situation to another ; the break 
between the two situations is too great. What we really have here 
is a study of shift in attitude. There remains for consideration one 
case in which the imagery used in the completion-test remained dur- 
ing the solution of the problem. This we shall discuss in connection 
with the results of the third part of the experiment. 

Just as in the first part of the experiment the reading of the 
problem was characterised by a feeling-component, so was 
it here. The O's were " annoyed," " irritated," " bothered," 
when the problem was read and the set task interrupted. 
We are again reminded of the experiments in perception. 

Experiment D. 3. Three-word Imagery 

In the third part o-f the experiment the procedure was 
more succesful so far as the setting up of a background of 
imagery is concerned. We have a total of 324 reports from 
the O's. These show that the imagery set up by the 3 words 
(to be referred to as the 3-word imagery) may behave &§ 
follows: 



COMSTOCK 224 

1. The imagery may drop out before the problem comes, or with 
the reading of the first word. Number of instances=~ 

St mulus : bells — horses — fire. Report: "I was trying to hear the 
bells ring when the problem came. This was carried by strain in the 
aura This trapped out at once and the problem was the only thing 
in mind" 1 

2. It rr.ay remain during the reading of the first few words ::' the 
problem: or during the whole of the reading of the problem, in v. 
case the problem may be rendered sensorily or cognitively unclear. 

~ber of instar: ::==" 

: t.ephant — man — sawdust. Report: " The 3-word ima^ry 

goc Vhen the problem began I did not attend, for I was 

engr th a visual image of the elephant and his trainer and the 

sawdust on the floor. Then I ' picked up ' a memory after-image of 

the first part of the question and the visual image dropped out " Z 

3. It may recur or it may fluctuate with (a) the reading of the 
problem or (&) the solution of the problem. Number of instances=46. 

Stimulus: June — st-ars — perfume. Report: "The 3 words set up 
~: '-': lit: r: ar. i : 
problem at first was obscure. The imagery persisted clearer than the 
oration. Then the imagery dropped out and the sensation became 
clear cognitively. The visual imagery came back very tr briefly 
There was no connection of meaning between the visual imart - ; 
and the auditory legation. Then the visual imagery dropped out, 
meaning that I could get no aid in the problem from die imagery " (H). 

- It may remain or recur (a) as a whole, ( b) in part, (c) changed 
in form or meaning or both. fa serve is ill or part of the anchoring 
imagery of the problem. Number of instance5=: " . 

Stimulus : red — fragrant — alive. Report : ?. - and ' fragrant ' 

called up a visual image of a red rose on a small bush. Then in 
verbal-motor imager; alive alive that's alive.' This imagery re- 
mained until E set the second situation (Problem: A man wanted 
to catch a kitten but the kitten ran up a tall tree which no person 
could climb. How could he get the kitten without hurting it?). The 
reading of the problem was accompanied by a shift in "ar^-; The 
thorns on the tree became large and looked wicked, meaning ' No 
;_:: :n can climb it' They also meant a very large bush like a tree 
The ros till on top and the kitten wa: near the rose" Z 

: It may remain or recur (a) as a whole, b) in part, (c) changed 
in form or in meaning or both, fa serve as the materia] for solving 
the problem. Number ::' instances==31. 

mulus: prisor. — stripes — chains. Report: "The 3-word imagery- 
was quite good and was of a prisoner in stripes with ball and chains 
on Ins leg .hen came the problem (Problem: How do you play 
' Snap the Whip! There was verbal-motor repetition of the prob^- 

lem which helped me to remember it. The visual imagery was modified 
and now included a lake and skaters. The prisoner stood still in the 
puddle of the lake as if the place where he had been in the 3-word 
imagery was now the ice. The ' ball ' became a man and the ' chain ' 
ring : Icaters. Then the string of skater 5 moved and the pris- 
tr.tr s:'::i there " D . 

ft may trop out as soon as the problem comes, but may recur 
after the answer to the problem has been given, in which case it may 



225 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

be (a) illustrative of the problem, (b) non-illustrative of the prob- 
lem. Number of instances=6. 

Stimulus : cat — yarn — basket. Report : " The 3-word imagery came. 
Then the problem was read (Problem: Suppose that you have been 
sitting in one position for a long time and your foot goes to sleep. 
What is the thing to do?). I hardly know what happened in the 
solution. I had a visual image which meant my foot going to sleep. 
This was an irregular patch with bright zigzag lines. Then I said 
the answer and back came the 3-word imagery" (D). 

7. It may serve as a background into which is projected a person 
or the himself who solves the problem. The background may last 
throughout the problem-solving or drop out before the problem has 
been solved. Number of instances=12. 

Stimulus: dew — garden — silence. Report: "A visual image of a 
nice flower garden in the early morning before sun-up. I was in it. 
When the question came that visual image was still there vividly 
and I was solving the problem, projected to that garden (Problem: 
Why is an octave so named?). I was in the garden thinking: 'octave, 
octagon ' in verbal-motor imagery. Then came the verbal-motor 
' eight ' and I said, ' do, re, mi, fa,' and gave my answer. The 3-word 
imagery was there until the end, but I was the important part in 
it" (Z). 

8. It may recur to serve as a means of escape from solving the 
problem. Number of instances=2. 

Stimulus : doctor — lawyer — minister. Report : " The 3-word imagery 
was present sharply and the problem came and was carried partly by 
visual imagery which was in the lower right part of the field (Prob- 
lem: If 3 oranges cost one fifth of a dollar, how much will 2 cost?). 
The rest of the problem was carried by verbal-motor imagery with 
here and there a visual tag, but the solution seemed to be in terms 
of verbal-motor imagery. The 3-word imagery recurred at least 3 
or 4 times. It seemed to be impossible to solve the problem. Later 
I made a specific effort. Once I said : ' Report that you can't do it.' 
Then by forcing myself I got the answer. Near the end there was a 
recurrence of the 3-word imagery. It was very, very scrappy" (D). 

9. It may persist either through part of the solution or until the 
end of the solution of the problem, in which case the problem-imagery 
is (a) in front of it, (b) at its left or right. Number of instances=10. 

Stimulus: infant — manger — wise men. Report: "There was good 
3-word imagery. It stayed, so that there was no break when the prob- 
lem came (Problem: How was Achilles made invulnerable?). When 
'Achilles ' was mentioned he seemed to be at the left of the other 
image ; larger and clearer. He was running. Then I started to give 
the answer " (S). 

10. It may remain throughout the solution until the answer has 
been given, in which case the O (a) can give no report, or at least 
no certain report, of the experiences leading to the answer, (b) states 
that the answer came immediately or automatically. Number of in- 
stances=5. 

Stimulus : chimes — snow — carols. Report : " The 3-word imagery 
was very good. Then came the reading of the problem and its mean- 
ing was carried in verbal-motor imagery (Problem: Where do cork^ 
for bottles come from?). The 3-word imagery was still there and 
almost as good in detail as before. There may have been a little 



COMSTOCK 226 

tag of visual imagery which carried part of the meaning for my 
answer; I am not sure. About here I found myself answering. I 
didn't know I was going to answer until I heard myself" (D). 

We are already familiar with some of the foregoing head- 
ings, so that a detailed discussion of them will not be neces- 
sary. The cases in which the 3-word imagery dropped out 
before the problem came included those in which the words 
had not evoked any imagery at all, and those in which the 
imagery was poor in detail and in clearness. Frequently, 
too, the set to solve the problem caused a clean break when the 
problem came, although the 3-word imagery might have been 
good. The cases in which the 3-word imagery remains or 
recurs during the reading of the problem or its solution are 
illustrative of the conflict between the Aufgabe and the 3- 
word imagery. The determination to solve the problem may 
overcome the 3-word imagery before the solution is actually 
entered upon or, as in the other possibility mentioned, the 
alternation between the problem-imagery and the 3-word imag- 
ery may continue during the solution of the problem. We 
find, too, that there may be a recurrence of the 3-word imag- 
ery after the answer has been given, that is, after the deter- 
mination to solve the problem has been satisfied and the O is 
free. These cases are evidences that we succeeded in giving 
our O's a background of imagery. A suggestion as to why 
the 3-word imagery dropped out is found in the report of an 
O who said : " The visual imagery carrying the 3-word situ- 
ation came back very briefly during the reading; then it 
dropped out, meaning that I could get no aid in the problem 
from the imagery" (H). This brings us to the cases in 
which the O did secure aid from the 3-word imagery. To 
just what extent the imagery was used in the anchoring and 
the solution of the problem the illustrations will have shown. 
That this is the economical mode of behavior for the 3-word 
imagery is obvious. The O's had a background of imagery, 
and upon this they drew in their solving of the problems. 
Frequently, only that part of the 3-word imagery which 
was relevant remained, the irrelevant part being lost ; a fur- 
ther proof of our thesis that irrelevant imagery does not ex- 
ist. We furnished our O's with imagery logically irrelevant 
to a situation in which they might need imagery. If no aid 
could be got from the 3-word imagery or, in other words, 
if it was totally irrelevant, it dropped out. If, however, it 
could be used, though only in part, it so far remained. The 
cases in which the imagery became changed to carry the mean- 
ing are of interest. They show again the tendency to economy 
and, as well, the importance of relevancy. The cases in which 



227 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

the imagery serves as an escape from solving the problem 
are like those met with in Experiment A. The cases in which 
the 3-word imagery remains as a background during the 
solution of the problem are further illustrative of use pushed 
to its limit. The has been revelling in a field of imagery 
from which he need not wholly withdraw ; that is, the 3-word 
imagery remains relevant to the new situation. 

Before we consider the cases included under the two last headings 
(9 and 10) it seems well to discuss the attitude of the O's toward the 
instructions during the last part of Experiment D. The smallest 
number of observations made by any one O was 55, the largest num- 
ber, 73. The same instructions were used throughout the experiment 
and the same kind of material. For the sake of convenience and 
somewhat as a matter of course, the material was divided into 4 
groups; the first group containing 10; the second, 13; the third, 15; 
and the fourth, 35 three-word situations. So far as the O's were con- 
cerned, the instructions underwent a process of specialization. That 
is to say, the reported behavior of the 3-word imagery at the begin- 
ning of the experiment is quite different from its behavior at the 
end. Let us, for purposes of discussion, divide our classification of 
the behavior of the 3-word imagery into 5 sections. The first section 
will include those cases in which the 3-word imagery dropped out 
either before or at the very beginning of the reading of the problem. 
The second section will include all cases in which the 3-word imagery 
hung over during either the reading or the solution of the problem, 
but in which it did not aid in the anchoring or the solution of the 
problem. In the third section will be placed the cases in which the 
3-word imagery was used as material for anchoring or solving the 
problem ; and in the fourth section, the special and relatively infre- 
quent uses of the 3-word imagery listed under headings 6, 7, and 8 
of our classification. There remain for the fifth section the cases in 
which the 3-word imagery was present throughout the entire solution 
of the problem. All 4 groups of the 3-word situations will be found 
in the first section. This is to be expected, since the adequacy of 
the 3-words for setting up imagery cannot be predetermined, and 
such a word-situation may occur in any one of the 4 groups. That 
the O's were, as time went on, more exactly obeying the instructions 
to take a passive attitude is shown by the relatively small number of 
cases in group 4 in which the 3-word imagery dropped out before the 
reading of the problem. In the cases included in the second section 
it is clear that the 3-word imagery is of more importance than it had 
been before. The O does not succeed in getting rid of it when the 
problem comes. This is perhaps due to the assumption of a more 
passive attitude with respect to the 3-word imagery. Nevertheless, 
the state of affairs is not satisfactory to the O; for he is hindered 
in both his comprehension and solution of the problem by the 3-word 
imagery. Group 4 of the 3-word situations contains the smallest 
number of cases of this kind, and group 3 the next smallest. This 
means that as the experiment went on the O was making a better 
adaptation to the complicated situation. When we come to a consid- 
eration of the third section we see at once a change. The 3-word 
imagery does not drop out with the coming of the problem, nor does 
it remain to disturb the O in his solution of the problem. It is used. 
The O has succeeded in meeting the situation with a minimum of 



COMSTOCK 228 

annoyance to himself. Two O's did not reach this stage until the 
fourth group of 3-word situations, and one O never reached it at all. 

The cases included in the fourth section we have discussed above. 
They are all illustrative of the uses of the 3-word imagery and, for 
the most part, occur in groups 3 and 4. What has been happening 
has been a specialisation of the instructions which is correlated with a 
successful adjustment to the situation. The specialisation has been 
in favor of the 3-word imagery. Instead of being a factor to be 
eliminated, it becomes one of value in meeting the situation, that 
is, in solving the problem. 

In the fifth section, which includes headings 9 and 10 of our classi- 
fication, the specialisation is continued. 

In stages 9 and 10 the 3-word imagery becomes so favored 
that it remains through the solution of the problem, either 
together with the problem-imagery or to the exclusion of 
the problem-imagery. There occurs a shift of relevancy from 
the problem-solving to the experiment as a whole. What the 
O does is to attend to both kinds of imagery, the 3-word and 
the problem. He is interested now, not so much in solv- 
ing the problem, as in giving a good report; a report that 
shall describe both the 3-word and the problem imagery. 
This sort of reaction to the experiment is confined to 2 O's, 
and occurs in the case of one of them altogether within group 
4 of the 3-word situations and in the case of the other within 
groups 2, 3, and 4. The reports show that in these instances 
a fluctuation between the 3-word imagery and the problem- 
imagery takes place, and that in the fluctuation the 3-word 
imagery does not completely disappear, though it loses in 
clearness and sometimes disappears for good before the pro- 
blem-imagery disappears and the problem has been solved. 
The 3 cases of superposition of the problem-imagery on the 
picture-imagery referred to in part 1 of Experiment D, 39 
and the one case in which the imagery used in the completion- 
test remained during the solution of the problem noted in 
part 2 of the same experiment, 40 are similar to the cases 
described here. They were reported by the same O, a fact 
which is further evidence of a special interpretation of in- 
structions and of a shift in relevancy from the problem solv- 
ing to the experiment as a whole. 

In the 5 cases (confined to the reports of 2 O's) found in 
part 3 of Experiment D and included under the tenth head- 
ing of the classification of the behavior of the 3-word imagery, 
the 3-word imagery is altogether favored. The O can give 
no report of the processes leading to the solution of the pro- 
blem. In some instances he states that there was some pro- 

39 Cf . p. 222 above. 

40 Cf . p. 223 above. 



229 RELEVANCY OF IMAGERY TO PROCESSES OF THOUGHT 

cess present but that " none came into great clearness." The 
other O stated that the answer was given automatically. In 
this connection we would call attention to the fact that in 
none of the 5 cases did the O's have any doubt as to the rel- 
evancy of the imagery present. In every case they were cer- 
tain that the imagery belonged to the 3-word situation and 
not to the problem, though they could not report on the imag- 
ery used in solving the problem. If, as Dr. Koffka thinks, 
we do not know whether or not our imagery in a given case 
is relevant or irrelevant, the O's might well have reported, 
since they were specifically asked to give such a report, the 
3-word imagery as the carrier of the solution of the pro- 
blem. But this is exactly what they did not do. 

The results of this experiment (D) confirm the results of 
those preceding. We have shown that, when imagery is occu- 
pying the focus of attention, if a new situation bearing no 
relation to it is introduced, two things may happen; the imag- 
ery either drops out, or it remains and is used in the new situ- 
ation. We have found also that there may occur a special- 
isation of instructions, which means a shift of relevancy from 
one attitude to another, but that in no case is there any irrel- 
evant imagery reported. 

General Conclusion 

All of the experimental work has led us to one conclusion, 
that there is no irrelevant imagery. That at the outset we 
had expected to find it is clear from our experimental pro- 
cedure. We hoped at first to get some evidences of it in- 
directly ; and when we did not succeed we arranged situations 
in which there were irrelevant factors. The analysis of irrel- 
evancies on the perceptive level showed that they are prin- 
cipally characterised by a feeling-component. This feeling- 
component we found in later experiments, though it was 
never a characteristic of irrelevant imagery, but always of a 
total situation irrelevant to another situation, each of which 
situations had its own relevant imagery. When we finally 
succeeded, in Experiment D, in giving our O's a background 
of imagery logically irrelevant to a situation later introduced, 
we still found no irrelevant imagery. In such a case, if the 
imagery could be used either as a whole or in part, it re- 
mained; otherwise it dropped out. We can, then, answer Dr. 
Koffka's criticism that " sensory contents may be irrelevant 
to the thought ;" 41 for we have seen that, if imagery is present, 
it is relevant ; and accordingly, if the author to whom he 

41 Koffka, op. cit., 219. 



COMSTOCK 230 

refers meant by analysis " nothing else than the exhibition 
of the sensory contents present at any given moment," 42 she 
was right in assuming that these contents were relevant to 
the thought. 

We have called attention to the fact that not only did all 
of the O's use imagery but that they frequently expressed 
a felt need for it. We have also brought evidence that this 
dependence upon imagery is not the result of laboratory con- 
ditions. 

42 ibid., 219. 



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